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‘Interoceptive awareness’, defined as the individual’s awareness of internal body 22 
signals, modulates self/other distinction under conditions of multisensory integration. 23 
We examined here, for the first time, the potential impact of interoceptive awareness 24 
on self/other distinction in the motor domain. In automatic imitation, inhibition of 25 
imitation is an index of an individual’s success in distinguishing internally generated 26 
motor representations from those triggered by observing another person’s action. This 27 
is measured by the ‘congruency effect’, which is the difference between mean 28 
reaction times when the observed action is ‘incongruent’ with the required action and 29 
when it is ‘congruent’. The present study compared the congruency effect in a typical 30 
finger lifting paradigm, with interoceptive awareness measured by heartbeat 31 
perception. Contrary to expectation, interoceptive awareness was positively correlated 32 
with the congruency effect and this effect depended on mean reaction times in the 33 
incongruent condition, indicating that good heartbeat perceivers had more difficulty 34 
inhibiting the tendency to imitate. Potentially, high interoceptive awareness involves 35 
stronger interoceptive representations of the consequences of an action, implying 36 
higher empathy, greater motor reactivity in response to observed action and hence a 37 
greater tendency to imitate. Our results may also tentatively be explained within a 38 





• Interoceptive awareness modulates self/other distinctions in body-awareness 44 
tasks. 45 
• Automatic imitation also indexes the ability to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’. 46 
• In a finger-lifting task, good heartbeat perceivers had larger ‘congruency 47 
effects’. 48 




1. Introduction 51 
The ability to distinguish between self and other is crucial to all aspects of self-52 
processing and has relevance for action-awareness (Farrer et al., 2003), body-53 
awareness (Tsakiris, 2013), empathy (Singer et al., 2004) and social cognition 54 
(Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). In the motor domain, self/other distinction has been 55 
extensively studied using ‘automatic imitation’ paradigms (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 56 
2001; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007), where the ability to resist imitating an action 57 
performed by another person is taken to indicate a stronger sense of self (Spengler, 58 
Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2010). Recent theories propose, however, that the 59 
self is grounded in ‘interoception’, which refers to the signals arising from within the 60 
body (Craig, 2010; Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013). Awareness of such internal signals 61 
has been shown to influence the ability to distinguish between self and other in 62 
multisensory contexts (Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013; Tsakiris, Tajadura-63 
Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). Given the inter-connectedness of perception and action 64 
(Friston, 2010; Hommel, 2009) the purpose of this study was to investigate whether 65 
awareness of interoceptive cues similarly impacts on self/other distinction in the 66 
domain of action. 67 
 68 
Humans have a tendency to involuntarily imitate actions that they observe. Thus, 69 
when an individual is required to perform a given action, observing another person 70 
perform an identical action typically facilitates performance, whereas observing a 71 
different action generally interferes with it, even when the observed action is entirely 72 
task-irrelevant (see Heyes, 2010, for a review). Although the term ‘automatic 73 
imitation’ is commonly used, the phenomenon rarely involves true imitation, in that 74 
people actually seldom perform the wrong action. They must, however, resist a 75 
tendency to copy the action they observe. The ability to inhibit imitation is measured 76 
by ‘the congruency effect’, which is the difference between the slower mean reaction 77 
time (RT) typically found when the required and observed actions are ‘incongruent’ 78 
(i.e. different) and the faster mean RT when the desired and observed actions are 79 
‘congruent’ (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000).  80 
 81 
According to the Theory of Event Coding, automatic imitation occurs because actions 82 
are coded in terms of their goals and thus their sensory consequences. The distinction 83 
between perception and action is thus a false dichotomy (Hommel, Müsseler, 84 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) and seeing an action necessarily primes the motor 85 
representation of that action. The Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) theory 86 
(Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009), suggests that visual and motor components of 87 
actions are linked by long-term stimulus response (SR) bonds, such that the activation 88 
of a visual mental representation necessarily predicts a motor representation (Heyes, 89 
2010). More recently, the theory of predictive coding has linked perception and action 90 
within a unified framework that may, in future, elucidate the neural mechanisms 91 
behind automatic imitation (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2012; Friston, 2010). 92 
 93 
Not only does automatic imitation rarely involve imitation but neither is it truly 94 
‘automatic’, because it is not immune to interference by other processes. According to 95 
the ASL model (Catmur et al., 2009) these processes can be divided into ‘input 96 
modulation’, which alters the extent to which the relevant long-term SR bond is 97 
activated, and ‘output modulation’, where social factors potentially inhibit the 98 
involuntary imitation (Heyes, 2010). Input modulation is demonstrated by selective 99 
attention to one’s own actions, which reduces imitation (Bortoletto, Mattingley, & 100 
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Cunnington, 2013; Chong, Cunnington, Williams, & Mattingley, 2009). Automatic 101 
imitation also can be reduced by modest amounts of training (Cook, Press, Dickinson, 102 
& Heyes, 2010; Gillmeister, Catmur, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & 103 
Haggard, 2005; Heyes & Bird, 2007), which reverses the muscle specificity of the 104 
motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) produced by TMS (Catmur et al., 2007).  105 
 106 
Output modulation depends on the top-down influence of participants’ traits and 107 
social attitudes. Eye contact, or priming with pro-social cues, enhances the 108 
congruency effect (Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2012; 109 
Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). Similarly, a desire to affiliate to the person 110 
observed increases automatic imitation in both experimental settings and social 111 
interaction (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). People scoring high 112 
in ‘self-monitoring’ (Snyder, 1974), or who have an interdependent self-construal, 113 
have a greater tendency to mimic others, possibly as an unconscious affiliation 114 
strategy (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Obhi, Hogeveen, & Pascual-Leone, 2011). 115 
Interestingly, priming participants with examples of interdependent self-construal 116 
increases the amplitude of MEPs elicited by TMS (Obhi et al., 2011), indicating that 117 
these top-down influences increase cortical excitability in the motor areas that 118 
produce imitation.  119 
 120 
Automatic imitation is one of a number of phenomena which involve ‘self/other 121 
overlap’, defined as “any phenomenon whereby an observer engages a state similar 122 
to that of the target, via activation of the observer’s personal representations for 123 
experiencing the observed state, whether through direct perception or simulation” 124 
(Preston & Hofelich, 2012). These shared representations occur at a very early, 125 
preconscious, processing stage. The ability to inhibit imitation requires that the 126 
individual distinguishes between internally generated motor representations and those 127 
that are triggered by observing other people’s actions (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 128 
2009). Successfully inhibiting the tendency to imitate activates cortical areas thought 129 
to be involved in discriminating between self and other (Brass, Derrfuss, & von 130 
Cramon, 2005; Brass et al., 2009; Brass & Heyes, 2005). The most active of these 131 
regions - the temporal parietal junction and anterior fronto-median cortex (BA10) - 132 
are related to perspective taking, feelings of agency and theory of mind (Wang, 133 
Ramsey, & Hamilton, 2011). Greater activation in BA10 correlates with smaller 134 
congruency effects and thus with better self/other distinction (Spengler et al., 2009). 135 
Furthermore, experimentally increasing self-focus reduces the congruency effect, by 136 
reducing RTs on incongruent trials (Spengler, Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach, 137 
2010). Similarly, observing an action increases the amplitude of MEPs if that action is 138 
attributed to another individual but reduces cortico-spinal excitability when the action 139 
is illusorily attributed to the self (Schutz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 140 
2006). 141 
 142 
Automatic imitation can therefore be characterised as a tool to measure how 143 
effectively the self can be distinguished from others (Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 144 
2009). The purpose of the current experiment was to investigate how the congruency 145 
effect is linked to ‘interoceptive awareness’ - a fundamental dimension of self-146 
awareness that has been the focus of recent research in body ownership (Tsakiris et 147 
al., 2011), self-recognition (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013) and empathy 148 




Recent neuroscientific models of the self emphasize the role of ‘interoception’ (Craig, 151 
2010; Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Hayes & Northoff, 2012; Panksepp & Northoff, 152 
2009) defined as “the afferent information arising from within the body, affecting the 153 
cognition, emotion or behaviour of an organism, with or without awareness” 154 
(Cameron, 2001). Insular cortex, which is activated by all feelings arising within the 155 
body (Craig, 2010; Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 156 
2009; Wiebking et al., 2013; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012), may underpin this 157 
fundamental representation of self (Craig, 2009; Seth, 2013; but see also Philippi et 158 
al., 2012). Recent predictive coding accounts of cortical function (Clark, 2013; 159 
Friston, 2010) similarly propose interoceptive information as an essential component 160 
of the self (Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). ‘Interoceptive 161 
awareness’, which is the extent to which internal signals reach consciousness, has 162 
been extensively studied in relation to emotion, stemming originally from William 163 
James’ theory that emotion comprises unconscious bodily responses (Damasio & 164 
Carvalho, 2013; James, 1890).  165 
 166 
Recent studies have begun to investigate the contribution of interoceptive awareness 167 
to self-processing. In the rubber hand illusion, people with low interoceptive 168 
awareness are more likely to claim ownership over a prosthetic hand, (Tsakiris et al., 169 
2011) and similarly experience a stronger illusory identification with a stranger’s face 170 
when they observe that face being stroked synchronously with felt touch on their own 171 
face (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013). Conversely, enhanced self-focus, through 172 
mirror self-observation, a self-photograph or self-relevant words, can improve 173 
interoceptive awareness in people for whom this is initially low (Ainley, Maister, 174 
Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013; Ainley, Tajadura-Jiménez, Fotopoulou, & 175 
Tsakiris, 2012; Maister, Tsiakkas, & Tsakiris, 2013). Individuals who see a virtual 176 
image of their own hand (Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013) or of their 177 
whole body (Aspell et al., 2013) have a greater sense of self-identification with, and 178 
self-location towards, the image under conditions of cardio-visual synchrony. 179 
 180 
Despite these investigations into the contribution of interoceptive awareness to 181 
self/other distinction in multisensory contexts, little is known about the potential role 182 
of interoception in the action system, for example in automatic imitation. This lack of 183 
empirical research is striking, given that human actions are thought to be driven by 184 
the goal of homeostatic control, which is signaled interoceptively (Craig, 2010; 185 
Damasio, 2010; Seth, 2013). Theoretical accounts of the neural basis of perception 186 
and action stress their inter-connectedness (Friston, 2010; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 187 
2007). While it has been previously assumed that the sensory consequences of an 188 
action are primarily exteroceptive, empathy for pain (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & 189 
Aglioti, 2005; Singer et al., 2004) and overlapping cortical activation during the 190 
experience, observation or imagination of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) can only be 191 
explained if actions involve a representation of their interoceptive sensory 192 
consequences (Heyes & Bird, 2007).  193 
 194 
Given that the ability to inhibit automatic imitation seems to index better self/other 195 
distinction, at the level of visual and motor representation, and also that people with 196 
high interoceptive awareness appear more reliably able to distinguish their own 197 
bodies from those of others, at a multisensory level, we hypothesised that in an 198 
automatic imitation paradigm individuals with high interoceptive awareness would 199 
successfully inhibit the tendency to imitate, whereas those with low interoceptive 200 
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awareness would exhibit less self/other distinction and would therefore have a greater 201 
tendency to automatic imitation. 202 
 203 
‘Interoceptive awareness’ is generally assessed using a heartbeat perception task 204 
(Schandry, 1981; Whitehead & Drescher, 1980). Such measures correlate with 205 
awareness of gastric cues (Herbert, Muth, Pollatos, & Herbert, 2012; Whitehead & 206 
Drescher, 1980). We used the Mental Tracking task (Schandry, 1981) which is well-207 
validated (Knoll & Hodapp, 1992), with good test retest reliability (Mussgay, 208 
Klinkenberg, & Rüddel, 1999; Werner, Kerschreiter, Kindermann, & Duschek, 2013) 209 
and which discriminates well between individuals. The measure we have called 210 
‘interoceptive awareness’ in this study assesses the accuracy of cardiac awareness, by 211 
comparing the subjectively reported number of heartbeats experienced with the 212 
number (objectively) recorded (Cuenen, Van Diest, & Vlaeyen, 2012; Garfinkel & 213 
Critchley, 2013). Gender, body mass index (BMI), and resting heart rate were also 214 
recorded, as possible confounds of the heartbeat perception task (Cameron, 2002). 215 
Automatic imitation was assessed using an established inhibition imitation paradigm 216 
developed by Brass and colleagues (Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 2009). It was 217 
anticipated that people who performed accurately in heartbeat perception would also 218 
be more accurate during the automatic attention task (show a smaller congruency 219 
effect). However, both these variables might be affected by participants’ general 220 
willingness and ability to attend to the tests. Attention is a possible source of input 221 
modulation in automatic imitation (Davis, 1983; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Preston & 222 
Hofelich, 2012). It has also been reported (Matthias, Schandry, Duschek, & Pollatos, 223 
2009) that interoceptive awareness is linked to scores on the d2 test (Brickenkamp & 224 
Zilmer, 1998), which measures individual differences in motivation and attention. We 225 
accordingly administered the d2 test as a check for this potential confound. 226 
 227 
2. Method  228 
2.1 Ethics statement 229 
The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee, Royal 230 
Holloway University of London. All participants gave written informed consent and 231 
were free to withdraw from the experiment at will. 232 
 233 
2.2 Participants 234 
Participants were 45 students at Royal Holloway University of London who 235 
participated for course credit. All declared themselves right handed and had normal or 236 
corrected to normal vision. The data for 2 participants was excluded for excessive 237 
numbers of errors (more than 10%, i.e. 3SD above the mean) in the action imitation 238 
task, indicating a failure to concentrate and follow the instructions. Of the remaining 239 
43 participants, mean age = 19.6 (SD = 4.9), 9 were male.  240 
 241 
2.3 Stimuli 242 
The stimuli consisted of sequences of 5 frames (Brass et al., 2005; Spengler et al., 243 
2009). Each video stared with a frame showing the hand, which mirrored the right 244 
hand of the subject, in the starting position, for 2s. The next two frames, each lasting 245 
34ms, presented a number (either 1 or 2) and simultaneously showed the finger 246 
movement (if any). The fourth frame showed the finger in the end position for 1.3s, 247 
with the number (1 or 2) superimposed. Between trials, the screen turned black for 248 
2.7s. Each video trial was thus 6s duration. The video hand was presented on a blue 249 




Figure 1. Example of the video stimuli for the index finger, from Brass et al., (2005) 252 
 253 
 254 
There were six possible video sequences, consisting of each of the two fingers (index 255 
or middle) in each of three conditions (baseline, congruent or incongruent). 256 
Participants were required to lift either the index (1) or middle (2) finger in response 257 
to a number appearing on the screen. The three possible conditions (for the index 258 
finger) are shown in Figure 1. Thus in the baseline condition, simultaneous with the 259 
appearance of the number, the video hand remained static. In the congruent condition 260 
the video hand lifted the finger that corresponded to the number shown (i.e. the index 261 
finger was lifted when the number 1 appeared). In the incongruent condition the video 262 
hand lifted the ‘wrong’ finger (i.e. the middle finger was lifted when the number 1 263 
appeared).  264 
 265 
2.4 Procedure 266 
2.4.1 Interoceptive awareness 267 
After giving informed consent, participants’ gender, age, height and weight were 268 
recorded. Heartbeat signals were acquired with a piezo-electric pulse transducer, fitted 269 
to the participant’s left index finger and connected to a physiological data unit (26T 270 
PowerLab, AD Instruments) sampling at 1 kHz which recorded the derived electrical 271 
signal onto a second PC running LabChart6 software (AD Instruments). Instructions 272 
for the Mental Tracking Method (Schandry, 1981) were presented over noise-273 
attenuating headphones. The onset and offset of each heartbeat counting trial were 274 
cued by the words “go” and “stop”, presented audiovisually. We used a standard 275 
instruction (Ehlers, Breuer, Dohn, & Fiegenbaum, 1995) whereby participants were 276 
asked to concentrate hard and try to silently count their own heartbeats, simply by 277 
“listening” to their bodies, without taking their pulse. The three trials (25s, 35s & 45s) 278 
were presented in random order. A criticism of the Mental Tracking Method is that 279 
participants may estimate the elapsed interval and then use knowledge of their own 280 
heart rate to guess the number of heartbeats. We therefore asked individuals to 281 
estimate the length of three, randomly presented, intervals (19s, 37s, 49s) and to 282 




2.4.2 Action imitation 285 
The stimuli were viewed on a standard PC, using Presentation software 286 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA). Participants were seated about 60 cm in 287 
front of the screen and were instructed to execute their movements as quickly and 288 
accurately as possible. Participants placed the index and middle fingers of their right 289 
hand on a serial response box which was linked to another PC which recorded the 290 
times of all finger movements, using Spike2 software (Cambridge Electronic Design, 291 
Cambridge UK). This recorded the onset of the visible stimulus on screen (i.e. the 292 
number 1 or 2, which coincided with the onset of movement of the video hand) and 293 
also recorded whenever the participant lifted an index or middle finger. Following 6 294 
tests trials, 150 trials experimental trials were presented in three blocks of 5mins, with 295 
obligatory rests of at least 2mins between blocks. The order of the presentation of the 296 
trials was fully randomised and comprised 25 trials in each of the 6 conditions.  297 
 298 
2.4.3 The d2 test of attention 299 
Finally, the d2 test was administered (Brickenkamp & Zilmer, 1998). This is a widely 300 
used measure of selective visual attention. The test items consist of the letters d and p 301 
with up to four dashes, arranged either individually or in pairs, above and/or below 302 
each letter. The subject is given 20s to scan across each of the 14 closely printed test 303 
lines, during which they must identify and cross out every letter d which has exactly 304 
two dashes, while ignoring all other distractor letters. The d2 test produces several 305 
norm-referenced scores, of which the most commonly reported are the total number of 306 
items processed (TN) regardless of whether these are correct or incorrect (this is a 307 
measure of processing speed), the percentage of errors made (E%) and the total 308 
number of items processed correctly (TN-E). This final score is designed to provide a 309 
measure of the capacity to selectively orient to relevant aspects of the task, while 310 
screening out irrelevant ones. 311 
 312 
2.5 Data reduction 313 
2.5.1 Interoceptive Awareness  314 
LabChart6 was employed to identify and count the number of R-wave peaks on the 315 
heart trace recorded for each participant in each trial, as well as to calculate the 316 
average heart rates for each trial (Jennings et al., 1981). Every heart trace was visually 317 
inspected for artefacts and the number of R-wave peaks was recounted manually, if 318 
necessary. No participant was excluded due to artefacts. Interoceptive awareness was 319 
calculated as (1/3Σ (1-(|recorded heartbeats – counted heartbeats|/recorded 320 
heartbeats)) (Schandry, 1981). Higher scores indicate higher interoceptive awareness. 321 
As a control on guessing, the participant’s ability to estimate the length of an elapsed 322 
interval was also calculated as (1/3Σ (1-(|estimated elapsed time – actual elapsed 323 
time|/actual elapsed time)) which we called the “time modulus” measure (Dunn et al., 324 
2010). 325 
 326 
2.5.2 Action imitation 327 
Data was extracted using Matlab (mathworks.com) and analysed with Microsoft 328 
Excel. The mean reaction time (RT) was calculated for each of the 6 conditions 329 
(congruent, incongruent and baseline, for each of the two fingers). The ‘congruency 330 
effect’ was found by subtracting the mean RT for congruent trials from the mean RT 331 
for incongruent trials.  332 
 333 
3. Results 334 
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3.1 Error analysis 335 
RT errors were removed before analysis. There were 2 possible sources of RT errors. 336 
Firstly, participants occasionally lifted the wrong finger. Secondly, in common with 337 
most RT analyses, some response times were omitted as outliers (Miller & Diego, 338 
1991). Thus RTs less than 80ms or greater than 800ms were excluded from the RT 339 
analysis (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001). The rate for all errors was 2.3% of trials. 340 
Two participants were excluded for total errors > 10% i.e. 3SD above the mean. The 341 
distribution of errors was thereafter approximately Normal, skewness = .64, kurtosis = 342 
-.16.  343 
 344 
Paired sample t tests (with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons and a 345 
significance level of 0.017) showed that there were significantly more errors in the 346 
incongruent condition than in the baseline, t(42) = 5.07, p < .001, but no significant 347 
difference between the numbers of errors in the congruent condition and baseline, 348 
t(42) = 0.82, p = .42,  replicating the finding of Brass et al. (2005). 349 
 350 
3.2 Reaction Time (RT) Analysis 351 
Repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with both the finger (index or middle) 352 
and the condition (congruent, incongruent and baseline) as within-subjects variables. 353 
Mauchley’s test of Sphericity was significant; therefore Greenhouse Geisser 354 
corrections were applied. There was a main effect of condition (RTs in the 355 
incongruent conditions were slower), F(2, 84) = 186.4, p < .001. This indicates 356 
significant automatic imitation i.e. slower mean RTs in the incongruent than 357 
congruent condition, for both fingers (Brass et al., 2000; Brass, Derrfuss, & von 358 
Cramon, 2005). There was a main effect of finger, F(1, 42) = 13.2, p = .001 (reaction 359 
times were generally faster for the middle finger), as shown in Figure 2. The 360 
interaction of finger and condition was also significant, F(2, 84) = 8.9, p < .001. 361 
Paired samples t tests (with Bonferroni correction and a significance level of 0.008) 362 
showed that, compared with RTs in the baseline, RTs in the incongruent condition 363 
were significantly longer when participants were required to lift their index finger 364 
rather than their middle finger, t(42) = 3.32, p = .002. However, there was no 365 
significant difference between the two fingers for RTs in the congruent condition, 366 
compared with the baseline, t(42) = .57, p = .57. Despite the significantly shorter RTs 367 
for the middle finger, particularly in the incongruent condition, the relationships 368 
between interoceptive awareness and the various reaction time measures in our study 369 
were very similar for the two fingers. For the remaining analysis we therefore used 370 
the mean of the data for the index and middle fingers, to give a single measure of 371 
average RT in each condition.  372 
 373 





To investigate the relationship between interoceptive awareness and the congruency 377 
effect, we calculated the latter, in the standard way (as the mean RT in the 378 
incongruent condition minus the mean RT in the congruent condition), for the average 379 
of the two fingers, for each participant. Correlations between interoceptive awareness 380 
and differences in RTs between conditions are shown in Table 1. Interoceptive 381 
awareness was positively correlated with the congruency effect (Figure 3) and this 382 
was wholly accounted for by RTs in the incongruent condition. Interoceptive 383 
awareness was significantly correlated with the difference between mean RTs in the 384 
incongruent condition and the baseline but not with the difference between mean RTs 385 
in the congruent and baseline conditions. 386 
 387 
Figure 3. Scatter diagram of the average congruency effect against interoceptive 388 








IA & ‘the congruency effect’ (mean RT in incongruent condition 
minus the congruent condition) 
 
r = .41 
p = .006** 
IA & mean RT in the incongruent condition minus the baseline r = .45 
p = .002** 
 
IA & mean RT in the congruent condition minus the baseline r = -.04 
p = .73 
** significant at the 1% level 395 
 396 
The wide range of mean RTs amongst our participants (318ms - 513ms, median 397 
398ms) might have affected our results. We therefore calculated the percentage 398 
difference in RTs between the incongruent and congruent conditions using the 399 
formula [{(mean RT incongruent - mean RT congruent)/mean RT baseline} x 100]. 400 
This statistic was also significantly positively correlated with interoceptive awareness, 401 
r = .40, p = .008. 402 
 403 
In this experiment we recorded a number of confounding variables known to impact 404 
on interoceptive awareness, namely gender, Body Mass Index (BMI), resting heart 405 
rate, and two measures designed to assess possible guessing on the Mental Tracking 406 
task (i.e. the ‘time modulus’ measure of the participant’s ability to estimate elapsed 407 
time, and the participant’s belief about his/her heart rate). An independent samples t 408 
test (with equal variances not assumed) showed no effect of gender on interoceptive 409 
awareness, t(41) = 1.32, p = .24. Likewise the correlation of interoceptive awareness 410 
and BMI was not significant, r = -.20, p = .21. Although people with slower hearts are 411 
often better heartbeat perceivers (Ainley et al., 2012; Cameron, 2001; Knapp-Kline & 412 
Kline, 2005), in this sample the correlation of interoceptive awareness and average 413 
heart rate did not reach significance r = -.22, p = .16.  414 
  415 
The ‘time modulus’ measure (of participants’ ability to estimate the length of an 416 
elapsed interval) was correlated with interoceptive awareness, r = .35, p = .02 but the 417 
correlation of interoceptive awareness and participants’ estimates of their own heart 418 
rates was not significant, r = -.08, p = .62.  419 
 420 
Table 2. Hierarchical multiple regression with the average congruency effect as the 421 
dependent variable 422 
 Step 1 
 










(p = .36) 
1.96 




(p = .14) 
0.40 ** 
(p = .009) 
0.41** 




(p = .82) 
 
0.26 
(p = .78) 




(p = .64) 
-0.66 
(p = .66) 
-0.10  






* significant at the 5% level 423 
** significant at the 1% level 424 
 425 
Given previous correlations in the literature between interoceptive awareness and both 426 
participants’ average heart rates and the ‘time modulus’ measure (Cameron, 2002; 427 
Dunn et al., 2010), we performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis with the 428 
average congruency effect as the dependent variable and independent variables 429 
comprising interoceptive awareness, average heart rate, ‘time modulus’, and their 430 
interactions. Only interoceptive awareness had any significant effect on the 431 
congruency effect (see Table 2). 432 
 433 
Results of the d2 test of attention were analysed in terms of the total number of items 434 
processed (TN), total number correct (TN-E) and percentage of errors (E%). 435 
Compared with published norms, d2 scores for our participants (mean TN = 516, 436 
mean (TN-E) = 493) were at the 70th percentile for students. Previous research 437 
(Matthias et al., 2009) found significant correlation between interoceptive awareness 438 
and TN but in this experiment none of the d2 measures were correlated with 439 
interoceptive awareness, for TN r = .03, p = .87, for (TN-E) r = .04, p = .82 and for 440 
(E%) r = -.02, p = .92. To replicate the analysis of Matthias et al. (2009), we split the 441 
data using their cut off at interoceptive awareness = .85 but found no significant 442 
difference in any d2 measures between ‘good’ (interoceptive awareness > .85, n = 5) 443 
and ‘poor’ (interoceptive awareness < .85, n = 38) heartbeat perceivers (e.g. for TN, 444 
F(1, 41) = .46, p = .50). There were likewise no significant correlations between any 445 
of the d2 measures and the average congruency effect, for TN r = .18, p = .24, for 446 
(TN-E) r = .11, p = .47, and for (E%) r = .15, p = .32. 447 
 448 
4. Discussion 449 
We investigated the relationship between interoceptive awareness and automatic 450 
imitation, measuring interoceptive awareness (IA) with a well-validated heartbeat 451 
perception task (Schandry, 1981) and automatic imitation by a widely used finger-452 
lifting paradigm (Brass et al., 2005). The expected ‘congruency effect’ was obtained, 453 
i.e. mean reaction times (RTs) were slower when the observed and required actions 454 
were incongruent and were faster when they were congruent (compared with the 455 
baseline of no observed movement). Interoceptive awareness was significantly 456 
positively correlated with the congruency effect. This was fully accounted for by the 457 
difference between RTs in the incongruent condition and the baseline. There were no 458 
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significant effects of interoceptive awareness on RTs difference between the 459 
congruent and the baseline. Thus the relationship we observed depended on RTs the 460 
incongruent condition and thus on interference between the observed and required 461 
action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005), indicating that people with high interoceptive 462 
awareness had greater difficulty inhibiting the tendency to automatically imitate. Had 463 
there been a motor facilitation effect, it would have taken the form of shorter RTs on 464 
congruent trials. RTs in the incongruent condition were significantly slower for the 465 
index finger than for the middle finger, probably because lifting an index finger is a 466 
more familiar experience than the isolated lifting of a middle finger, with a 467 
consequently stronger, learned associative bond. 468 
 469 
The result we obtained was contrary to our original hypothesis. Experiments in 470 
multisensory integration have suggested that people with high interoceptive 471 
awareness are better at making self/other body ownership distinctions (Tajadura-472 
Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011). We hypothesized that this effect 473 
might translate into the motor domain. The ability to inhibit imitation is assumed to 474 
index self/other distinction (Spengler et al., 2009) and we therefore predicted that 475 
people with high interoceptive awareness would more successfully inhibit the 476 
tendency to imitate. Our results show that, on the contrary, they were more inclined to 477 
imitate, implying greater self/other overlap. 478 
 479 
Despite the findings from body-ownership paradigms, which suggest that high 480 
interoceptive awareness is linked to better ability to make self/other distinctions, this 481 
is likely to be context dependent. Thus while low interoceptive awareness might 482 
predict greater ability to distinguish between self and other in cases of multisensory 483 
body-related integration (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2011), in 484 
other contexts high interoceptive awareness seems to suggest greater self/other 485 
overlap. A fundamental difference between self/other distinction in the automatic 486 
imitation task and self/other distinction in the rubber hand illusion is that confusion in 487 
the automatic imitation task is at a representational level and at a point in time where 488 
participants have no sensory information about their own movements. The link 489 
between interoceptive awareness and automatic imitation may therefore be indirect 490 
and depend on the sensitivity of people with high interoceptive awareness to social 491 
influences. Thus the concentration of our effect in incongruent cues indicates that it 492 
depended on the action observation aspect of the task and therefore on output 493 
modulation, rather than the preparation of the individual’s own action (input 494 
modulation). The lack of correlation between the congruency effect and the d2 test 495 
also supports this conclusion. The d2 test scores are measures of “the capacity to 496 
selectively orient to relevant aspects of the task while screening out irrelevant ones” 497 
(Zimmerman & Frimm, 2002). The d2 was included to counter the criticism that if we 498 
had found the hypothesised correlation between high accuracy in both the heartbeat 499 
detection and the automatic imitation tasks, this might have reflected the participants’ 500 
level of motivation and attention. We did not replicate previous reports of a 501 
correlation between high interoceptive awareness and selective and divided attention 502 
(Matthias et al., 2009), indicating that general differences in individuals’ motivation 503 
and attention to the tasks were unlikely to have confounded our results. 504 
 505 
In terms of the Associative Sequence Learning model of automatic imitation (Catmur 506 
et al., 2009) output modulation is occasioned by social factors which influence 507 
individuals to suppress or enhance the tendency to imitate. High interoceptive 508 
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awareness has been linked to anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010) and particularly to 509 
social anxiety (Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, & Umeda, 2013). We did not assess 510 
trait anxiety in this study but potentially, if our high interoceptive awareness 511 
participants were more socially anxious, they might have had a greater desire to 512 
affiliate, which could have enhanced their tendency to imitate. 513 
 514 
A potential source of output modulation is affective empathy, which is assumed to 515 
involve shared representations between one’s own emotional state and that of another 516 
individual (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Iacoboni, 2009; Preston & Hofelich, 2012; Zaki, 517 
Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). People with high interoceptive awareness are 518 
thought to exhibit greater empathy (Ernst et al., 2013; Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, 519 
& Umeda, 2013), perhaps because they have a stronger interoceptive representation of 520 
the consequences of an observed action, for example, they are more sensitive to 521 
masked fear conditioning (Katkin, Wiens, & Ohman, 2001). Scores on the empathetic 522 
concern scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983) correlate with the 523 
amplitude of heartbeat evoked potentials (Fukushima, Terasawa, & Umeda, 2011), 524 
which are larger in people with high interoceptive awareness  (Pollatos & Schandry, 525 
2004). Empathy has, in turn, been linked to action observation. Kaplan and Iacoboni 526 
(2006) found that when participants observed another individual reaching for a cup, 527 
inferior frontal mirror activity was greater in those people who had higher scores on 528 
the Empathetic Concern subscale. Such motor activity in response to action 529 
observation is also linked to a greater tendency to imitate (Catmur et al., 2007; Obhi 530 
et al., 2011; Schutz-Bosbach et al., 2006). Empathy is inversely correlated with 531 
narcissism and it has recently been shown that individuals who are high in trait 532 
narcissism - thus displaying a lack of empathy and concern for others - have a greater 533 
ability to inhibit automatic imitation (Obhi, Hogeveen, Giacomin, & Jordan, 2013). 534 
Thus high interoceptive awareness may involve stronger interoceptive representation 535 
of the consequences of an action, implying higher empathy, greater mirror neuron 536 
activity in response to observed action and hence a greater tendency to imitate.  537 
 538 
Our results may alternatively depend on some hitherto unexplored aspect of 539 
interoceptive awareness and its relationship to the action system. Given that accounts 540 
of cortical function, including both the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel, 2009) and 541 
predictive coding (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010) stress that perception and action are 542 
reciprocally connected, further research is needed to confirm whether interoceptive 543 
awareness impacts not only on action in interoceptive systems but on motor activity 544 
as well. The basis of inter-individual differences in interoceptive awareness is not 545 
well understood (Verdejo-Garcia, Clark, & Dunn, 2012). Such differences have 546 
generally been assumed to depend simply on the strength of interoceptive signals 547 
arising within the body, which are conveyed principally by the vagus nerve (Craig, 548 
2003; Cameron, 2002; Critchley et al., 2007). However, interoceptive awareness may 549 
perhaps be interpreted in a predictive coding context (Friston, 2010; Seth et al., 2011).  550 
 551 
Hypothetically, high interoceptive awareness might relate to the high ‘precision’ of 552 
interoceptive signals, which could, in turn, account for the high levels of autonomic 553 
activity that have been observed in people with good interoceptive awareness 554 
(Herbert, Pollatos, Flor, Enck, & Schandry, 2010; Pollatos, Füstös, & Critchley, 555 
2012). Although very speculative, it seems possible that interoceptive signals are 556 
more reliable and attended (i.e. more precise) in people with high interoceptive 557 
awareness, which would account for these individuals’ reduced liability to body 558 
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ownership illusions. Given that interoceptive awareness affects perception of the 559 
body, it is also likely to modulate action representations. It has recently been indicated 560 
that in order to avoid mirroring another person’s actions it is essential to reduce the 561 
precision of proprioceptive precision errors (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011). If 562 
people with high interoceptive awareness have initially precise proprioceptive 563 
precision errors, then their tendency to imitate others may be accounted for. 564 
Potentially, recently observed individual differences in levels of neurotransmitters in 565 
the insula (e.g. Wiebking et al., 2013) may provide the means to unravel the links 566 
between interoceptive signals and proprioceptive, motor and autonomic reflexes.  567 
 568 
5. Conclusion 569 
Interoceptive awareness, measured by the accuracy with which people perceive their 570 
own heartbeats, is known to modulate self/other distinction in multisensory contexts. 571 
Here we demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive awareness also impacts on 572 
shared representations in the motor domain, such that people with high interoceptive 573 
awareness have greater difficulty in inhibiting the tendency to imitate, in a standard 574 
automatic imitation paradigm.  575 
 576 
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